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维护君主立宪制

Posted: 07-02-09 Sat 6:16 pm
by 老黄
霹雳政权变易,看到国阵领袖纷纷以“维护君主立宪制”来批评民联领袖,不禁摇头叹息!

他们知道他们在讲些什么吗?

早前登嘉楼州务大臣委任的风波,那么快就忘记?

今天霹雳州苏丹有其政治立场,乃至行使皇室特有能力给政治作出裁决,其实是一种与“君主立宪”背道而驰的做法。这一点,不只是政党领袖,乃至全民都应该醒觉——是在玩火!

今天巫统领袖为霹雳州陛下的支持而欢呼,但是若日后有其他州苏丹的政治立场与他们不一样,也同样行使皇权时,他们该作何反应?

所谓君主立宪应该是:
《百度百科》 wrote:君主立宪制,或称“虚君共和”,是相对于君主独裁制的一种国家体制。君主立宪是在保留君主制的前提下,通过立宪,树立人民主权、限制君主权力、实现事实上的共和政体。其特点是国家元首是一位君主(皇帝、国王、大公等等,教皇有时也被看做是一个君主)。与其他国家元首不同的是,一般君主是终身制的,君主的地位从定义上就已经高于国家的其他公民(这是君主与一些其他元首如独裁者的一个区别,一般独裁者将自己定义为公民的一员,但出于客观需要他必须掌权为国家服务),往往君主属于一个特别的阶层(贵族),此外世袭制也往往是君主的一个特点(不过在这一点上也有例外)。
http://baike.baidu.com/view/49838.htm

Posted: 07-02-09 Sat 6:18 pm
by 老黄
这一篇文章发人深省:

这是一场“苏丹政变”
潘永强
2月7日 中午12点22分

霹雳州王储在二月三日庆祝霹雳苏丹登基25周年活动上发表演词,他指出王室必须维持中立,同时声称尽管统治者是住在高墙之内,但不会妨碍他们对社会民情的掌握。

反讽的是,短短几天之后的二月六日下午,由于霹雳州苏丹做出了一个令许多人民极难接受的决定,导致数千人游行到江沙皇宫前示威,而且根据报导,还有示威者向霹雳州王储的座车喝倒采。

众多民联支持者在最后一晚涌向霹雳州务大臣官邸的高墙之内,向执政仅十个月的尼查州政府致意,但隔日另有数千愤怒群众奔赴皇宫,在高墙以外,向正在里头进行着的新任大臣宣誓仪式呛声抗议。

墙内墙外,两种风景,对向来颇受尊重的霹雳苏丹及其王储而言,都是极为尴尬、耻辱和不体面的经验。

局面演变如此,与霹雳苏丹的争议性决定绝对有关。巫统策动的跳槽事件,意图重夺霹州政权,此举在现实政治操作中,实乃权力政治常态,本无值得非议之处,除非夺权涉及丑恶交易。

可是,人在高墙之内的苏丹,却在处理过程中加剧了宪政危机,严重毁损了君主立宪的宪政规范,对正处民主转型阶段的大马政治而言,极可能铸成历史性的伤害。有人把这次纳吉操盘下的霹州变天形容为一场政变,其实不够精确,这其实也是一场“苏丹政变”,政权是在皇宫内转移的。

政变原指透过不合宪政规范和正当合理的手段来取得政权。掌权者可以发动自为政变(self-coup),实不罕见。上世纪九十年代秘鲁总统藤森就曾经发动一场“总统政变”,毁损自已不能控制的国会,以达扩张政治权力的意图,俄罗斯在耶尔钦时期,也曾经发生过坦克炮轰国会的总统政变。

在这里,我们无意指称霹雳苏丹在处理政治危机时,有扩大皇权之动机,但它造成的实质结果,则是苏丹以极度不符我国宪政体制和宪政运作规范的方式,以一人之意变更政权,而凌驾民意。这过程既有违程序正义,也制造宪政危机,并且剥夺选民重新做出裁决的机会,以及打击国人对君主立宪的信心和尊重。

事实上,按议会民主和君主立宪的宪政运作规范,以及霹雳州宪法精神,当民选的民联政府面对议员跳槽而致州政权不稳,州务大臣其实有多个选项,一是如果觉得大势已去,可以宣布辞职下野,二是请求苏丹解散州议会,重新改选,三是召开州议会,寻求信任投票支持,四是展开政治运作,挽回议会多数的支持。

通常,在成功的君主立宪运作经验中,世袭统治者必须超越政治,不介入现实的政治操作,只扮演国人团结和统一的象征。一般上,在政治理性和风险评估下,民选政府只有万不得己才会选择提前解散,立宪君主在不干政的原则下,很少会拒绝解散的请求,坐视政治危机蔓延下去。

但是在这次霹雳政局危机中,深具法学素养的霹雳苏丹,却一连做出三个非比寻常、不合宪政惯例的动作,不只无助于危机化解,反而激化野朝对立,甚至令民怨逐渐把矛盾指向皇宫。

首先,苏丹在没有合理的理由下,竟然拒绝州务大臣的解散要求,扩大现有的政治僵局,使内阁制下经由议会解散化解政治危机的宪政机制,完全无法启动。

但是,更使宪政学者(而非一般不谙宪政理论的法律人士)觉得难以理解的是,苏丹在做出不同意解散的决定后,其动作还没有停止,反而在二月五日发出的皇宫文告中,竟然谕令州务大臣与全体行政议员总辞,并且立即生效。此举在客观上马上造成了妨碍政治运作的干扰效应,还限制政治精英的选项和策略。

在君主立宪的精神下,统治者面对解散议会的要求时,其裁量权只限于同意或不同意,而不是介入背后的现实政治运作。霹雳苏丹在文告中下令州务大臣辞职,就是一种超越宪政规范的不合理举动。通常,苏丹在做出解散同意与否的决定后,他化解危机的角色就已经告一段落,其余的发展就留待政治人物进行党政运作。

如果议会解散,就意味着重新改选,这个过程没有苏丹可介入的角色,要是不同意解散,也得交由民选政治精英展开政治角力,这时政治精英可以选择的方案,包括维持少数政府、协商大联合政府,或是发动不信任投票。也就是说,政权的延续或变更,必须回归政治运作,完全不应由苏丹越俎代庖。

可是,这回我们不只看到霹雳苏丹越俎代庖地下令民联政府的尼查辞职,苏丹的第三个令人错愕的动作,就是在文告中进一步“先发制人”,宣称如果州务大臣与全体行政议员拒绝总辞,将视同“悬空”。此举不只压缩政治精英们的党政运作空间,也隐然衬托出皇宫的偏差、好恶与不中立。

但更为怪异和突兀的是,苏丹还一一召开四位跳槽议员,征询他们的政治态度与立场,可是争取议员支持的工作,应该是留给政治领袖去运作协商,甚至进行朝野交易,岂是由苏丹出马,取代政党精英的游说过程。

化解政治僵局的宪政运作,除了依据宪法条件外,也要考虑宪政的规范与惯例,尤其不得对笼统、抽象、简略的宪法文本作狭隘、技术性和语义式的诠译,因为宪政体制的运作与政治僵局的化解,尚要考虑到政治现实、国家利益、社会民意,以及传统惯例。英国没有成文宪法,但数百年来就是仰赖惯例、传统、经验、规范,以及宪政学理的滋养,而成世界典范。

然则,霹雳州王室在这次政治危机中的积极介入、强势参与的姿态,却是严重压缩和排除民意的表达,阻断了宪政体制中化解危机的既有设计,也干扰了党政运作的空间。当各报纷纷刊登苏丹召见许月凤的照片时,王室高度介入政治过程的印象,就令人难以抹去,如果霹州苏丹有意以此确立宪政前例,那么这种发展就不得不令人担心。

事实上,在英国君主立宪数百年的经验下,世袭统治者的权力只有缩减的趋势,只是我国独立后行宪经验尚短,还没有足够的案例和传统,才令到各界对苏丹的裁量权有宽松不一的诠释。可是,在一个稳定的宪政制度中,宪法保留给苏丹的权力是固定的,不会扩大也不会缩小,不能因为个别不同的解读就产生变化。

在这个基础上,我得进一步指出,我国现有的宪政体制并非没有“反跳槽”的机制设计,反而,要是有任何议员跳槽,或政党退出执政联盟,而致政府面临垮台之虞,只要启动宪法上的解散议会之程序,即可达到反制跳槽、重新寻求民意,以及保障程序正义等效果。

易言之,现行宪政体制在运作上的灵活特性,其实已可以起到“反跳槽”的作用,同时也具备了“反跳槽”的相关机件与设计。相反的,如果王室不依宪政常理来处理政治危机,而试图另辟途径,不只将对政党政治的运作产生诸多扭曲的后果,还可能制造更多的混乱与危局。

这一回,在议会和民意程序还没有走完之前,苏丹在宫廷内就决定了政权的变更,广大选民要求重新改选的意愿无法落实,这不只否决人民追求民主参与的机会,也挫伤国阵政权的合法性和道德性。

此刻苏丹的姿势和身影,犹如回到以前扮演过的法官角色,先是召见各人收录供词,然后作一仲裁。但一位立宪君主最重要的是行宪与护宪,不是做出裁决和评断,而是避免社会卷入更激烈的分歧,否则,世袭统治者在此役中遭遇的非议与质疑,会远比夺权的巫统来得严重与受伤。

原刊:
http://www.malaysiakini.com/columns/97800

Posted: 08-02-09 Sun 12:50 am
by 老黄
RPK wrote:When the Rulers of Perlis and Terengganu ‘interfered’ in Umno’s choice of Menteri Besar, we hailed them as great Rulers who are full of justice and wisdom. When the Rulers agreed to allow Pakatan Rakyat to form the Perak and Selangor state governments, they are the best Rulers in the world. Whenever things go our way we are full of praise. But as soon as the decision does not favour us they are haprak Rulers.

The Rulers are a disappointment. We are disgusted with our Rulers. Our Rulers sold out to Umno. Malaysia should abolish the Monarchy and turn the country into a Republic. And so on and so forth. That is what is on the lips of many Malaysians. But if the Rulers had favoured the opposition, even though they did so in violation of the law and the Constitution, we will hail the Rulers as amongst the best in the world.
http://mt.m2day.org/2008/content/view/17783/84/

Posted: 16-02-09 Mon 11:50 pm
by 老黄
http://mt.m2day.org/2008/content/view/18103/84/

The Malays Rulers’ loss of immunity
Saturday, 14 February 2009 11:04

Background

From its inception in 1957, the Constitution of Malaysia has provided an immunity to the Malay Rulers (or Sultans) against civil actions or criminal prosecutions. Early in 1993, the Constitution of Malaysia was amended to remove this immunity. Although the federal Constitution of Malaysia and the constitutions of the states of Malaysia leave the Rulers as mere constitutional monarchs, they have wielded considerable influence due, in part, to the traditional reverence of the Malay people for their Rulers.

The ability of the Government to bring about these constitutional amendments is noteworthy in light of the traditional reverence Malay people have for the Malay Rulers. The apparent public support for the changes suggests a shift in traditional Malay cultural values that appears to have irrevocably reduced the significance of the Malay Rulers in Malay society and in the politics of Malaysia.

The 1983 Constitutional Crisis

In 1983, the government proposed amendments to the Constitution, which for the first time brought the Rulers openly into conflict with the government and with UMNO, the party that had claimed to be the protectors of the Rulers since the time of the Malayan Union struggle. The proposed amendments altered the provisions with respect to the King's assent to bills deeming the King to have assented to any bill, which the King had not given his assent to within fifteen days. A similar amendment would have been required in each of the state constitutions.

The proposed amendments would also have provided for a change in the power to declare an emergency. The emergency powers give broad powers, upon the declaration of an emergency, to promulgate ordinances having the force of law at any time Parliament is not sitting. Prior to the proposed amendment it was the King, upon satisfaction that a grave emergency existed, who had the power to declare an emergency. The King was to act on the advice of cabinet. The proposed amendment would have given the Prime Minister the power to instruct the King to declare an emergency.

The amendments were apparently considered necessary because of an upcoming election for King in which the two potential candidates for the Kingship, following the order set out in the Third Schedule to the Federal Constitution, were Rulers who had caused problems for their respective state governments. It had been reported that one of the candidates for the Kingship had suggested that on becoming King he would exercise the power to declare an emergency and then seek to exercise governmental powers him self. Further, each of these Rulers had taken exception to the ten Chief Ministers of their states and had taken steps that ultimately led to the resignation of the Chief Ministers. Of particular concern was the forced resignation of a Chief Minister after two years of refusals by the Ruler to give assent to state legislation. The proposed amendments were sought to avoid any similar problems, which either of the two candidates for the Kingship might cause for the federal government upon becoming King.

The King, at the behest of the Conference of Rulers, refused to give his assent to the amendment bill. This was followed by political rallies by the Prime Minister and a media blitz which portrayed UMNO as the protector of the Rulers against radicals seeking the abolition of the monarchy and which exposed the allegedly extravagant lifestyles of the Rulers of the states of Perak and Johor. Eventually a solution acceptable to both the government and the Rulers was found. The final amended version of the Constitution provided that the King, within 30 days of the passing of a bill by both houses, would either give his assent to the bill or, if it was not a money bill, return the bill to Parliament with a statement of reasons for his objection to the bill.

If, on the return of a bill, the bill was again passed by both Houses it would again be presented to the King for his assent and the King would have 30 more days to assent to the bill after which time the bill would become law "in like manner as if [the King] had assented to it". The requirement for similar provisions to be adopted in state constitutions was dropped in return for an oral assurance that assent to bills passed by state legislatures would not be unreasonably delayed by the state Rulers. The amendments with respect to emergency powers were withdrawn. The compromise also included oral assurances that the Rulers of the states would not unreasonably withhold assent to state legislation and that the proclamation of an emergency would not be exercised unilaterally by the King.

The ability of the government to mount sufficient public support for a change to the assent provisions that would more clearly limit the powers of the King and, at least through an oral assurance, the powers of the Rulers, indicated a change in Malay society with respect to the importance of the Rulers. It suggested a decreasing importance of the Rulers as a symbol of, and in the protection of, Malay political supremacy. Nonetheless, there appeared to be sufficient public support for the Rulers to allow them to prevent a more substantial incursion into their powers.

UMNO's Justification for the Amendments and Opposition to the Amendments

UMNO's justification for the amendments was that they were necessary to protect the Rulers and preserve the institution of the Rulers as constitutional monarchs. In response to claims that the amendments represented the first step towards the creation of a republic, UMNO pointed to the amendments on sedition, which continued to make persons liable for statements in Parliament or a Legislative assembly advocating the abolition of the monarchy. Otherwise, amendments to the provisions on sedition were said to be necessary because although abuses by Rulers were known of in the past, little could be done because no one could voice criticisms of the Rulers even in Parliament or the State Legislatures and thus the public could not be made aware of the problems faced by the Government.

Semangat 46, an opposition party that was formed upon the break up of the former UMNO party, opposed the amendments, taking arguably the strongest pro-royalty stance of any party. While it agreed that some steps needed to be taken so that the Rulers could "hear the grievances of the Rakyat", it claimed that the proposed amendments interfered with the sovereignty of the Rulers and were a step towards the formation of a republic. They argued that the ultimate removal of the Rulers would take away an important aspect of Malay culture and tradition and a symbol of Malay unity.

The Democratic Action Party (DAP), a primarily Chinese opposition party, which is part of an opposition coalition with Semangat 46, originally supported the government in December when it expressed the need for action to be taken in light of the Gomez incident. It also initially supported the amendments. However, it abstained from voting when the amendments were introduced in Parliament in January. The reason they gave for the abstention was that the Constitution required the consent of the Rulers to amendments affecting their privileges and such consent had yet to be given. According to DAP, the consent was required before the amendments could be introduced in Parliament. DAP was accused of sacrificing its principles in favour of preserving their opposition coalition with Semangat 46.

The Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS), a Malay pro-Islamic party and part of the opposition coalition, supported the government's call for action and the move to lift the Rulers' immunity in light of the Gomez incident but later abstained from voting on the amendments introduced in Parliament in January. Although it claimed to be in favour of the removal of the Rulers' immunity because it was not in accord with the principles of Islam, it said that the amendments were not "comprehensive enough" and that it did not like the manner in which the wrongdoings of the Rulers were exposed in the House. PAS was arguably in a difficult position in that it may have wanted to avoid alienating the Kelantan royal family whose support could be influential in staying in power in the state of Kelantan.

The Rulers' Compromise

The decision of the Conference of Rulers not to consent to the proposed changes to the Constitution was followed by stepped-up pressure on the Rulers. It was announced that henceforth the payment for the expenses of the Rulers would be limited to those that were expressly provided for by the law. The government would no longer pay for the building and maintenance of rest houses, additional palaces, private wards in hospitals, yachts and aircraft. The refusal of the Rulers to give their consent to the proposed amendments was followed by a barrage of media coverage exposing alleged excesses of the Rulers. There were also further reports of influence by the Rulers in government affairs.

Eventually, on February 11, it was announced that a compromise had been reached and that the Rulers agreed to give their consent to the proposed amendments but with certain changes that were agreed to. There were two changes to the amendments tabled in the House on January 18. One was that a Ruler charged with an offence in the Special Court should cease to exercise his functions as a Ruler. Pending the decision of the Special Court a Regent would be appointed to exercise the functions of the Ruler. A Ruler convicted of an offence by the Special Court and sentenced to imprisonment for more than one day would cease to be the Ruler of the State unless he received a pardon.

A similar provision was added with respect to the King. The other change was that no action, civil or criminal, could be instituted against the King or a Ruler of a State with respect to anything done or omitted to be done in his personal capacity without the consent of the Attorney General. Overall, the modifications appeared to be relatively minor. The revised amendments were submitted to Parliament and were passed by both Houses on March 9, 1993.

Cultural Change and the Struggle for Power The Struggle for Power

The government argued that the amendments to the Constitution in response to the Gomez incident, by removing the immunity of the Rulers, were a step towards increased democracy in Malaysia. Viewed in their broader context, the amendments were part of an inevitable struggle for power between the executive branch of government and the Rulers. The removal of the Rulers' immunity does not, on the face of it, directly increase executive powers. However, the focus, in the midst of the amendment debate, on the alleged orders given by Rulers to government officials, pressure put on government officials to obtain government contracts and timber concessions, alleged extravagant expenses, and alleged interference in government affairs suggests there was more to the whole affair than just the removal of the Rulers' immunity.

In part, the allegations were made to put pressure on the Rulers to consent to the removal of their immunity. However, the exposure of these alleged extravagances put the Government in a position to crack down on the influence of the Rulers. The removal of the Rulers' immunity, and the apparent public support, may put the Government in a better position to leave the Rulers to pay for unbudgetted expenditures presented to state and federal governments after they have been incurred. The Rulers can now be sued for those expenses. Many of the alleged actions of the Rulers through which they exerted influence may now be the subject of legal proceedings before the Special Court. The form, which the removal of immunity ultimately took, also appears to give the executive additional leverage over the Rulers. Three of the five judges of the Special Court are the Lord President and the Chief Justices of the High Courts who are appointed at the behest of the Prime Minister.

The proceedings, civil or criminal, can only be undertaken with the consent of the Attorney General, and, in the context of criminal proceedings, expose a Ruler to the potential loss of his position as Ruler. This seems to give the government a significant tool for bringing an unwieldy Ruler into line. Indeed, as Raja Aziz Addruse, a lawyer and editor of the Journal of the Malaysian Bar (and member of a royal family), has said, the amendments will arm the Executive with the power to subjugate the Rulers through threats of prosecution for any offences, however minor. The Rulers will be at the mercy of the Executive. ... The power to prosecute is a powerful weapon, which, in the hands of the ruthless, can be abused to great advantage - not by prosecuting the alleged offender but by withholding prosecution in return for his cooperation.

Cultural Change and Why the Government Acted When it Did

Although the Gomez incident was the catalyst for the amendments, concerns about the influence and excesses of the Rulers had been raised in the past. At the UMNO generally assembly in November of 1990, a resolution was passed that sought to clarify the role of royalty in politics in light of alleged involvement of some of the Rulers in the October 1990 general election. In 1992, UMNO had drafted a set of guidelines for the Rulers to address some of the concerns. The Prime Minister also commented in his speech to Parliament on the introduction of the amendments that concerns about problems with the Rulers had been noted for quite some time. Thus, the Gomez incident was merely the opportunity the Government needed to muster political support to deal with the influence of the Rulers that had vexed the Government for some time.

The Government might have responded earlier to the increasing expense and influence of the Rulers and their interference in government. However, in the time between 1983-84 constitutional crisis and the 1993 constitutional amendments, the Mahathir government faced a serious leadership challenge in 1987 and a general election in 1990. The Mahathir government may have also felt the need for support from the Malay Rulers, particularly in the 1990 general election when they faced the challenge of Semangat 46, which claimed to be the champion of Malay causes and the true protector of Malay institutions such as the monarchy. Challenging the Rulers at that time would have risked the loss of Malay support crucial to any political coalition hoping to form the government.

By 1993, the position of the Mahathir government was more secure. The government coalition's dominant Malay political party was showing signs of increasing concern over the problems encountered with respect to the Rulers. They appear to have also felt the time was right for a challenge to the Rulers in light of even greater changes in the attitudes of Malays towards the Rulers than had been the case at the time of the 1983 constitutional crisis. In the 1983 constitutional crisis, the government had to accept substantially reduced constraints on the Rulers compared to those it had originally sought. Nonetheless, the government's success in amending the constitution to constrain the powers of the Rulers in 1983, modest though it may have been, had indicated that attitudes of some Malays towards the Rulers were changing.

The New Economic Policy (NEP) introduced in the early 1970s facilitated an increase in the number of highly educated Malays. Malays educated either overseas or in Malaysian Universities were exposed to Islamic principles or concepts of democracy neither of which squared with the notion of an un-elected Ruler with broad powers. In the ten years that passed after the 1983 constitutional crisis, the number of highly educated Malays increased. Thus, the change in the cultural attitudes of the Malays towards the Rulers apparent in the 1983 constitutional crisis had, if anything, become more pronounced.

The NEP had also encouraged the development of a Malay entrepreneurial class. This new class of successful Malay business persons may have felt less need for the privileges accorded Malays through the quota system and citizenship provisions the protection of which was vested in the Rulers by the Constitution. Their interests were also affected by the business interests of the Rulers and the influence of the Rulers in obtaining government contracts, licences and timber concessions.

The Malay entrepreneurial class, as well as the non-Malay entrepreneurs, may have felt their business potential was constrained by the competitive advantage Rulers and their royal families could obtain through their influence. Many Malays may have also come to the view that the real source of protection for their special rights and privileges, to the extent they still hold these dear, is not so much through the Rulers as it is through the leverage they hold in the political process. These changes in the cultural attitudes of Malays permitted a more substantial challenge to the position of the Rulers than had been possible in the past.

UMNO and the governing coalition appear to have sensed that the support of the Malay Rulers was no longer necessary to secure the support of the Malay population. For the Rulers the consequence of this change in the attitude of Malays is that the importance of the Malay Rulers for the Malay people and in Malaysian politics appears to have been substantially, and probably irrevocably, reduced.

Conclusion

The removal of the Rulers' immunity was a significant constitution al development in Malaysia. The move of the executive to rein in the influence and alleged excesses of the Rulers was brought about with apparent public support that is perhaps somewhat surprising given the historical reverence to the Malay Rulers and their importance as a symbol of Malay unity. The Government demonstrated a willingness to crack down on influence and extravagance, a step they would have been unwilling to take if it meant the loss of the precious support of the Malays.

Their ability to take the steps they did suggests a continuing change in the cultural attitude of the Malays to the Malay Rulers. The reduced degree of unquestioning reverence for the Malay Rulers and their symbolic significance appears to be more substantial than it was in 1983 given the relatively limited success of the Government in 1983 compared to 1993. The Malay Rulers had been exerting considerable influence in Malay society and politics in spite of the constitutional limits on their powers. However, the events of 1993 appear to have irrevocably reduced the significance of the Malay Rulers in Malay society and in the politics of Malaysia.

Professor Mark R. Gillen
Faculty of Law University of Victoria, Victoria, BC Canada
http://www.scribd.com/

Posted: 17-02-09 Tue 3:27 pm
by 舜本
http://www.sun2surf.com/article.cfm?id=30090


Sultan has ‘reserved powers’
11:51AM Tue, 17 Feb 2009

MANY are unaware that the Sultan of Perak has what is called "reserved powers".

This "reserved powers" are the Sultan’s inherent powers that he inherits which he may use upon his discretion at any one time to prevent any crisis that might jeopardise the stability and peace of his state.

After the general election last year, the Raja of Perlis and the Sultan of Terengganu also used their "reserved powers" to appoint mentris besar of their choice, even though it went against the choice of candidates of Prime Minister Datuk Seri Abdullah Ahmad Badawi. Every state in the federation has its own constitution besides our Federal Constitution.

However, literal interpretation of each state’s constitution without taking into account the rulers "reserved powers", will only cause much dissatisfaction and confusion.

These "reserved powers" are ambiguous and surrounded by grey areas in every state’s constitution because it is not evoked at all times. Therefore, when a situation arises and the rulers evoke these powers, they seem to have gone against the democratic will of the people.

We must always realise that the rulers do play an important role in maintaining harmony among various races under their care.

Vijay Shanmugam
Taiping

Posted: 21-05-09 Thu 10:04 am
by 进翊
相信司法程序对国阵有利
霹雳国阵不会解散州议会

Editor 15-05-2009 15:20

[霹雳政局峰回路转] 特别报道! 比起古时候春秋战国不相上下的霹雳州政坛,是否会真如一般人所推测,将会面对解散而重新举行大选?然而,根据来自国阵内部消息,这答案是否定的,并相信国阵最后能在司法程序中胜出。

《辣手杂志》探悉,即使现时的霹雳州议会出现双大臣和双议长的窘局,但是国阵会通过法律管道,以逐步化解宪制上的危机,直到州议会恢复原来的面貌为止,即国阵拥有大臣和成功的更换议长,而民联到头来只是拥有28名议员,在州议会内外扮演反对党的角色而已。

法庭案件未完结前 国阵仍坚持赞比里合法

国阵认为,虽然民联一直通过各种舆论和宣传来打击国阵,指国阵漠视吉隆坡最高法庭作出的裁决,在大臣双胞案未澈底解决之前,就让赞比里继续出任大臣是违规和违法。

不过,为了免霹雳州行政瘫痪,国阵赞比里重新出任大臣后,马上宣布州内除太平市议会外的其它市、县议会已被录取的官委议员人选名单,并迅速举行宣誓仪式。同时继续召开州行政议会会议,国阵并不理会民联继续的叫嚣和各项指责。

国阵:民联若继续干扰恐影响州政府操作

国阵的解释是,如果继续让民联干扰霹雳州政局,霹雳州的所有行政系统和操作就会僵硬不前。这样让民联有更多藉口抨击国阵政府的不是。

因此,国阵不会中计而另谋出路,不能够继续由民联做主吵嚷著要解散州议会而举行大选。

据悉,国阵知道现时州举行大选对国阵相当不利,甚至会输到焦头烂额,所以国阵不会贸然同意民联的建议把州议会解散。

民联与首相见面 也不能解散州议会

据国阵最新消息透露,尽管民联与国阵主席兼首相将有意聚首,商谈化解霹雳州的宪制危机,但是国阵不会因而答应解散州议会,而这场会谈的结果不会被看好,除非民联肯退而求其次,或与国阵组有条件的联合政府。否则,国阵见招拆招,依然是不会解散现时仍由国阵控制著的州议会。

国阵有信心赢官司

一名国阵人士表示,虽然国阵目前还面对多层次的法律诉讼案,例如大臣双胞、议长双胞,不过,国阵依然有信心赢得最后的官司,而避过了解散州议会的命运。
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